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Abstract. Web-based Doodle polls, where respondents indicate their
availability for a collection of times provided by the poll initiator, are
an increasingly common way of selecting a time for an event or meeting.
Yet group dynamics can markedly inﬂuence an individual’s response, and
thus the overall solution quality. Via theoretical worst-case analysis, we
analyze certain common behaviors of Doodle poll respondents, including
when participants are either more generous with or more protective of
their time, showing that deviating from one’s “true availability” can have
a substantial impact on the overall quality of the selected time. We show
perhaps counter-intuitively that being more generous with your time can
lead to inferior time slots being selected, and being more protective of
your time can lead to superior time slots being selected. We also bound
the improvement and degradation of outcome quality under both types
of behaviors. AQ1
1 Introduction
Online scheduling tools such as Doodle (www.doodle.com) are a popular way
of scheduling events or meetings, with Doodle reporting in 2011 that “online
scheduling is used by 67% of the Swiss and 21% of the rest of the world”.1 More
recent data indicate that in 2014 Doodle had over 20 million monthly users
worldwide, with more than 17 million polls created in 2013.2
In a Doodle poll, the goal of the poll initiator is to determine the most suitable
time for an event or meeting. The initiator selects a set of possible meeting
times and sends the Doodle poll invitation to the potential participants. Each
participant then checks the boxes for the times they are available to meet; with
the default Doodle options, full information about the responses is available to
both the initiator and all participants.
Figure 1 shows an example of an open yes-no Doodle poll where three par-
ticipants have each indicated availability for one or two of the six time slots
proposed by the poll initiator; a fourth participant can now enter her name and
check boxes for her availability. She can easily see previous responses and that
1 https://en.blog.doodle.com/2011/07/13/.
2 https://en.blog.doodle.com/2014/01/29/.
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the most popular slot thus far is 1:00 PM on Saturday April 30, 2016, indi-
cated both via the frequency counter at the bottom of the poll, and the boldface
number showing the currently most popular time. As seen here, the Doodle algo-
rithm simply recommends the time slot(s) with the most checked boxes, or “yes”
responses.
Fig. 1. An example open Doodle poll after three
participants have indicated their availability.
This social choice mecha-
nism employed by Doodle is
equivalent to approval voting,
where each voter in an election
chooses to approve or disap-
prove each of the candidates. In
a Doodle poll, the “voters” are
the participants and the “candi-
dates” are the time slots.
While approval voting is the
mechanism adopted by a num-
ber of professional societies,
including the AMS (American
Mathematical Society) and the
MAA (Mathematical Association of America), such a mechanism clearly has lim-
itations. For one, a voter has no way to express her preference for one candidate
she approves over another candidate that she also approves. To be fair, Arrow’s
classic impossibility theorem has long established that when choosing among
three or more candidates, all voting mechanisms have ﬂaws [1]. But approval
voting in particular has been a point of controversy, called by Saari and Van
Newenhizen [15] a “cure worse than the disease”, because, as summarized by [7],
“the same voter proﬁle can produce many diﬀerent results, depending on where
each voter decides to draw the line between approved and non-approved candi-
dates.” On the other hand, this “feature” of approval voting can be viewed as an
advantage, as, according to Brams et al. [3] as interpreted by [7], “it gives each
voter ‘sovereignty’ over the way she expresses her preferences.” It is precisely
the variation in the location of this “line” drawn by each voter that we model
and give a preliminary theoretical analysis for in this work.
We assume each voter has a privately-held, normalized, utility value for each
candidate time slot. Intuitively, the utility can be thought of as a quantiﬁcation
of how much the voter expects to beneﬁt from attending the meeting at that
time (even if derived simply by satisfying some professional obligation) minus
any inconvenience/cost of attending the meeting at that time. To measure the
“goodness” of a time slot, we consider the social welfare, or total utility of all
voters, for that slot. The fundamental question we ask is, “How well does a
Doodle poll work for selecting a time?” We proceed using a standard theoretical
worst-case analysis approach common in the algorithms research community.
First we ask, how bad can the time slot chosen by the Doodle mechanism be
in comparison to the time slot with maximum social welfare? We show that if an
event organizer wishes to maximize social welfare in selecting a time slot, they
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How Well Do Doodle Polls Do? 3
naturally should not choose one with few “yes” votes. But we also show that,
perhaps counter-intuitively social welfare of the chosen slot can be low if people
are being very generous with their time and are therefore voting yes too readily.
We further show that when voters are protective of their time, voting “no” on
slots for which they are available (i.e., slots for which they have utility above
the typical voter’s “yes”-threshold), the social welfare can worsen in some cases,
while improving in others. We deﬁne the notion of a positive (resp. negative)
welfare impact factor and bound the positive (resp. negative) welfare impact
factor of voting protectively. We also show that when voters are cooperative,
voting “yes” on slots for which they are not easily available (i.e., slots for which
they have a utility below the typical “yes”-threshold), the welfare can also both
improve in some cases, while worsening quite dramatically in others. We also
provide bounds on the the positive (resp. negative) welfare impact factor of
voting cooperatively.
1.1 Related Work
Doodle polls are just one of the group scheduling tools available, and previous
research has studied these more generally, considering the conditions under which
they are used and useful, and the implications thereof [9,12,16].
There has been extensive research done in approval voting dating back to the
1970s. For surveys on approval voting from the voting theory literature see the
book by Brams and Fishburn [2] and the article by Weber [17]. We note that
while many researchers have accepted for decades that strategic and manipu-
lative voting behavior is “inevitable” and have continued to seek to quantify
the negative eﬀects of it [4], even with respect to approval voting in particular
[5,10], others have long argued that the notion of self-interested voting in any
large-scale election is implausible, since the act of voting itself is “irrational”
[8,14]. In contrast to these large-scale political elections, Doodle polls are usu-
ally conducted on a small scale; a sample of over 340,000 polls from the US in
a three-month period in 2011 had a median of about 5 respondents and 12 time
slots [19], so it is fair to assume that strategic voting indeed takes place.
A recent work of Zou et al. analyzes real Doodle poll data and demonstrates
that indeed, Doodle poll participants seem to vote strategically. They hypothe-
size and give positive evidence for a theory of “social voting” where voters are
more likely to say yes to popular time slots, perhaps in an eﬀort to be cooper-
ative [19]. Our model does not attempt to address the “social voting” behavior
of the voters. Instead we present a simple model that focuses on the aspect of
Doodle polls where some participants generally lean toward being more generous
with their time and others lean toward being more protective of their time.
Reinecke et al. [13] also analyze anonymized Doodle poll data, this time from
countries around the world, and showed that voting behavior is indeed informed
by cultural norms and societal expectations, which supports our model’s notion
of an externally-imposed default “yes”-threshold value.
More recently, Obraztsova et al. [11] model the Doodle poll as a game, where
players have utilities for each slot, similar to our model. Their paper focuses
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instead on identifying and showing that trembling hand perfect Nash equilibria
(under the assumption that voters derive a utility bonus when they act coop-
eratively) behave consistently with the “social voting” theory [19] of Zou et al.
And in an earlier work, Xu [18] proposes the use of auctions as an alternative
to Doodle polls for selecting a good time slot, citing the beneﬁt of allowing par-
ticipants to specify a valuation for each slot in an auction setting, as well as the
tendency of participants to give false or incomplete information in Doodle polls.
One way to quantify the eﬀects of strategic voting is to use welfare as a
metric. Lehtinen [6] studies the welfare of approval voting outcomes using a
simulation-based approach, concluding that the percentage of simulated voting
games where the welfare-maximizing candidate is chosen is rather high, whether
voters are sincere or utility-maximizing. While our work also uses social wel-
fare to measure the eﬀects of voting behaviors, our methodology is purely via
theoretical worst-case analysis. And rather than assuming the traditional utility-
maximizing voters, we consider what happens when sincere voters either vote
cooperatively (a la the social voting model of Zou et al. [19]) or are more pro-
tective of their time.
2 Theoretical Framework
2.1 Formalizing a Yes-No Doodle Poll
We ﬁrst formalize the activities encompassed in a yes-no Doodle poll, gener-
ally following the notation of [19]. A poll initiator creates a poll with a set of
time slots, namely A = {a1, a2, . . . , am}, for consideration. The poll is then
made available to the n participants or voters in a given poll, denoted by
V = {v1, v2, . . . , vn}. Each voter’s response or vote is a binary vector ri for
voter i, over the m time slots in A, with ri(a) = 1 if voter vi approves slot a,
and ri(a) = 0 otherwise. When it is clear from the context, we use vote to either
refer to the full vector, or to the binary value the voter assigns to a speciﬁc time
slot. A vote of 1 is considered a yes vote, and a vote of 0 is a no vote.
We thus deﬁne a Doodle poll instance to be a 4-tuple I = (A, V, U,R), where
A is the set of time slots, V is the set of voters, U is the matrix of utility values
each voter has for each time slot, and R is the response matrix of votes that each
voter enters for each time slot. In this work, we assume for simplicity that yes
and no are the only options for voters. While Doodle does have an “if-need-be”
option than can be added, the empirical data of [13,19] provided by Doodle on
polls from July-September 2011 contained very few three-option polls [19]. Their
dataset likewise showed that the vast majority of polls were open, where voters
can see the responses of participants who have already responded, as opposed
to closed, where only the poll initiator can see the responses.
Let s(j) =
∑n
i=1 ri(j), or the total count of yes votes for slot j, be the
reported score for a slot aj . Note that in Doodle, all voters are given equal
consideration; there is no weighting of the votes. The default Doodle algorithm
is simply to determine the one or more slots which maximize the total reported
score, that is maxj∈A s(j). Thus, Doodle may report multiple maximum-score
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time slots, and the poll initiator then ostensibly chooses among those slots.
(While the poll initiator is of course free to choose a slot with a lower score, in an
open poll, which is by far the most commonly-used kind [19], the participants can
all see which slots have the most votes, so it is reasonable to assume that the poll
initiator will generally choose among the slots recommended by Doodle.) Doodle
provides no tie-breaking mechanism, but human poll initiators may certainly
have biases (e.g. preferring slots selected by board members or senior personnel;
time slots that are personally convenient; the earliest time slot; etc.), and so we
assume that when there is a tie, any of the tied slots may be selected.
2.2 Valuations and Voter Types
We now consider the assumptions we make about how a voter determines his or
her vote. We assume that for each time slot aj a voter vi has a utility uij with
0 ≤ uij ≤ 1 indicating her valuation of attending the meeting or event during
that time slot. This utility value may be thought of as somehow representative
of or derived from how much monetary value a voter would place on attending
the event at a given time.
We assume that there is a yes-threshold 0 ≤ t ≤ 1 that represents the utility
beyond which a voter “typically” votes yes, so each participant or voter vi is
expected to say yes (i.e. ri(aj) = 1) to a time slot aj when her utility for that slot
uij ≥ t. We note that we are assuming this typical yes-threshold is an externally-
imposed or socially-determined global value for all voters. Incorporating the
possibility of individual default yes-thresholds ti for each voter i is a direction
for future work.
Notice that unlike with Doodle polls, in approval voting, regardless of where
a person chooses to “draw their line” as long as they are voting sincerely (never
voting “no” on one candidate while simultaneously voting “yes” on a less pre-
ferred candidate), they are considered to be voting honestly. Whereas in Doodle
polls, there is some notion and expectation that the participants will not only
be sincere, but also be “forthcoming” about their “true” availability.
Indeed, other studies have often assumed that the most straightforward,
“honest” behavior of a voter is simply to vote “yes” on those time slots for
which she is available, and “no” on those she is unavailable. However, we note
that availability is not so black and white, and in theory, people can make them-
selves available for any time slot, at varying degrees of cost. Our model accounts
for the fact that a person’s degree of “availability” is in fact on a continuum. For
example, if one wished to consider negative utilities (for time slots where costs
outweigh the beneﬁts of attending), then a natural yes-threshold would be at
utility 0. In this interpretation of the model, the voting behavior of the players
can be seen as “honest” (when they vote yes if and only if their utility is posi-
tive), or “dishonest” (when they either vote no for positive-utility time slots, or
vote yes on negative-utility slots). Re-scaling utilities to the interval [0, 1] allows
the previous threshold value of 0 to also be accordingly mapped to a value t in
the interval [0, 1].
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On the other hand, if the community culture or larger social/societal expec-
tations imply a diﬀerent “default” threshold t for voting yes on a time slot,
where here we think of t as the utility threshold beyond which a participant
is “ordinarily expected” to agree on a time slot, then our model still applies.
Normalizing the utility values so that they lie between 0 and 1 and using some
non-speciﬁed default threshold t makes our model general enough to capture
multiple interpretations of the utility values and voting.
We assume all participants are sincere in their completion of polls, i.e., if vi
says yes to a time slot aj which has utility uij then they also say yes to all slots
ak with utility uik > uij . Note that the social voting hypothesis arising from
empirical data analyzed by Zou et al. [19] supports the expectation of sincere
participants. (See their Proposition 2.)
Yet in reality some people are either more protective of their time, voting no
on a slot even when their utility for it is above the yes-threshold t, or more coop-
erative, voting yes on a slot even when their utility is below the yes-threshold t.
While our analysis does not assume that a poll is open or closed, there are cer-
tainly plausible reasons why either variant could lead voters to be protective or
cooperative. Note that while such terms may sometimes have associated positive
or negative connotations, we merely use them to categorize participants, and no
judgment of the voters’ behavior is intended.
We deﬁne an ordinary voter to be one who votes according to the yes-
threshold t, as expected, voting yes to exactly the time slots aj for which her
utility uij ≥ t, and no to all others. It might be helpful to think of ordinary voters
as those who are responding “honestly” in some sense, akin to how other works
have discussed a participant’s “availability” in a black and white way [13,19].
But the term ordinary more impartially allows our model to apply to the idea
that one’s availability is on a continuous spectrum and t is the threshold beyond
which social convention dictates one should respond yes.
We deﬁne a cooperative voter to be one who agrees to slots that are below the
yes-threshold t, ostensibly trying to make more slots viable options at one’s own
expense. Since we assume voters are sincere, this is in practice the same as the
voter “lowering” the value of the yes-threshold t for her votes. So she eﬀectively
uses a diﬀerent threshold t′ < t such that she says yes to a time slot aj if and
only if her utility uij ≥ t′.
We deﬁne a restrictive voter as one who votes no on slots that are above
the yes-threshold, perhaps trying to be more protective of her time. Due to our
assumption of sincerity, this is equivalent to the voter “raising” the value of the
yes-threshold t for her votes. So she uses an alternative threshold t′ > t such
that she says yes to a time slot aj when her utility uij ≥ t′.
2.3 Analysis Model
We now present the metric we use for the overall quality of each time slot as
well as the framework we use for our analysis of the eﬀects of the above-deﬁned
voting tendencies.
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The social welfare of a given slot aj is u(aj) =
∑n
i=1 uij , the total utility
assigned to that slot by all voters. Note that the social welfare is a measure
of the theoretical goodness of a time slot; it does not account for the actual
attendance of the participants, who may ultimately not attend a time slot for
which they had voted yes, or may in fact attend at a time slot for which they
had voted no.
We use OPT (I) to denote a slot which maximizes the social welfare in a
given Doodle poll instance I, and u(OPT (I)) to denote the utility (welfare) of
an optimal slot. Hence
OPT (I) = arg max
aj∈A
n∑
i=1
uij , u(OPT (I)) = max
aj∈A
n∑
i=1
uij .
Let DDL(I) likewise denote a time slot returned by the default Doodle algo-
rithm, and let u(DDL(I)) denote the utility (welfare) of DDL(I).
In the spirit of worst-case analysis, the conventional approach of the theoreti-
cal algorithms (and algorithmic game theory) communities, we aim to determine
a quantity that captures how far from optimal the Doodle poll mechanism may
be. We therefore deﬁne the welfare approximation ratio of an algorithm DDL for
choosing a time slot to be the maximum over all possible Doodle poll instances
of the ratio u(OPT (I))/u(DDL(I)). I.e., if I is the set of all possible Doodle
poll instances, the welfare approximation ratio of the default Doodle algorithm
DDL is
max
I∈I
u(OPT (I))
u(DDL(I))
.
We also consider in this work the eﬀect of cooperative and restrictive voting
on welfare. To quantify this eﬀect, we again employ worst-case analysis. Let a
partial Doodle poll instance I ′ be just the ﬁrst three elements (A, V, U) from
the 4-tuple of a complete Doodle poll instance. Let I ′ be the set of all partial
instances, and let RO(I ′) denote the response matrix that results from a given
partial instance I ′ ∈ I ′ when all voters are ordinary. Let RC(I ′) and RS(I ′)
be the set of all possible response matrices when a positive number of voters
are cooperative and restrictive, respectively. (We drop the I ′ when the instance
is clear from context.) Then we deﬁne the positive welfare impact factor (resp.
negative) of cooperative voting to be
max
I′∈I′
max
RC∈RC
u(DDL(I ′, RC))
u(DDL(I ′, RO))
, max
I′∈I′
max
RC∈RC
u(DDL(I ′, RO))
u(DDL(I ′, RC))
.
Intuitively, these quantities represent the extreme limits of how many times
better (resp. worse) social welfare can become when voters are cooperative (as
opposed to ordinary).
We deﬁne welfare impact factors for restrictive voting analogously. To suc-
cinctly specify a partial Doodle poll instance (A, V, U), we use a table such as
Table 1a to indicate the utility values of diﬀerent categories of participants for
each of the possible time slots in a Doodle poll.
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Table 1. A template for displaying participants’ utilities, voter types (ordinary, coop-
erative, or restrictive), and the number of voters in each group is given in (a), (b) is
an example instance using this table format yielding a welfare approximation ratio of
1
t
+ n−x
x
. (See Lemma 2, below, for more details on (b).)
Participants Time Slot 1 ... Time Slot m
# voter type utility . . . utility
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
# voter type utility . . . utility
(a)
Participants 1 2
x ordinary t 1
n − x ordinary 0 t − 
(b)
3 Ordinary Voting
We start by evaluating how well the selected slot optimizes social welfare when
all participants are ordinary voters. Throughout the examples and analysis, let
 > 0 be a ﬁxed constant, which may be arbitrarily small. We begin with an
upper bound on the welfare approximation ratio of Doodle, and then we give an
instance that demonstrates this upper bound is tight.
Lemma 1. The welfare approximation ratio of the default Doodle algorithm with
only ordinary voters is strictly less than 1t +
n−s∗
s∗ , where s
∗ is the score of the
winning time slot.
Proof. Consider any Doodle poll instance, I. We deﬁne s∗ = s(DDL(I)), i.e.,
the score of the winning time slot, with 1 ≤ s∗ ≤ n. (We exclude an s∗-value
of 0 because that would mean that all voters voted no for every time slot in
the poll.) A reported score of s for the slot picked by the algorithm, meaning
exactly s∗ yes votes, ensures that u(DDL(I)) ≥ s∗t, since ordinary voters vote
yes precisely when their valuation is greater than or equal to t.
Since the time slot OPT was not picked, it must have an equal or smaller
reported score than that of DDL. Note that if OPT and DDL had equal reported
scores, the poll initiator has no additional information from the poll about voters’
utilities for tie-breaking, and thus could have picked either OPT or DDL. Thus,
the OPT time slot has at most s∗ voters who voted yes (their valuation is at
most 1) and the rest, at most n − s∗, have valuation strictly less than t. Thus
the optimal social welfare is u(OPT ) < s∗ + (n − s∗) · t. Hence, the ratio of the
social welfare of OPT compared to the social welfare of the solution selected by
Doodle is u(OPT )/u(DDL) < s+(n−s
∗)t
s∗t =
1
t +
n−s∗
s∗ .
The approximation ratio is largest when t is small, or when n − s∗ is large:
these observations illustrate some of the inherent limitations of Doodle polls.
The ﬁrst limitation, a poor ratio when the yes-threshold t is small, shows that
if people are “too willing” to say yes to a time (perhaps trying to be more
agreeable), the chosen slot may be far from the best. Explicitly, as the yes-
threshold decreases, the approximation to optimal welfare worsens. The second
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limitation, that the ratio is largest when n−s∗ is large, is perhaps less concerning
in practice. When n − s∗ is large, that means that s∗, the reported score, is
small, and many poll initiators would expect worse results in terms of overall
social welfare when the ‘most popular’ slot has a small number of people voting
yes for it.
The delicate dependence on t we have established also points to ways voters
may exploit the system, intentionally or unintentionally. Suppose that there are
only two slots, and most people value slot a1 at or just above t, but strongly
prefer slot a2, with a valuation near 1. Most people thus vote yes to both slots. A
single person who values both slots at above t but would rather have slot a1 can
now sincerely vote yes for a1 and no to a2 to get their preferred slot, harming
the social welfare. Alternatively, a diﬀerent individual could vote yes for their
preferred slot a2, even if their utility for both is below t, causing the slot with
the overall better social welfare to be selected.
The formulation of the above proof gives rise to the following instance, show-
ing that the upper bound of Lemma1 is tight.
Lemma 2. The welfare approximation ratio of the default Doodle algorithm with
only ordinary voters is at least 1t +
(n−s∗)(t−)
s∗t , where  > 0 may be arbitrarily
close to 0.
Proof. Consider the instance represented in Table 1b. The utility of the ﬁrst slot
is u(a1) = xt, while u(a2) = x+(n−x)(t−). The reported scores with ordinary
voters are s(a1) = x and s(a2) = x, and thus s∗ = x. Thus, with the tie, either
spot may be chosen, and if a1 is chosen, the indicated ratio is achieved.
While ties such as the instance in Table 1b may in fact be a reality in Doodle
polls, if the tie-breaking aspect seems disconcerting, consider that one additional
ordinary voter with valuation t for slot a1 and 0 for a2 can be added, so that the
reported scores are now no longer tied, but the achieved ratios are comparable
for suﬃciently large n. Likewise, the instance need not have only two time slots;
there can be many more slots, all with reported score less than s∗, and lower
total social welfare. Since Lemmas 1 and 2 give matching bounds, we have the
following theorem.
Theorem 1. The welfare approximation ratio of the default Doodle algorithm
with only ordinary voters is arbitrarily close to 1t + n − 1.
4 Restrictive Voting
In this section, we make the assumption that some subset of the participants of
size  are restrictive voters, while the rest, n−, are ordinary voters. Though the
 must all vote restrictively, they need not have identical valuations. We show
that restrictive voting can not only harm, but also improve the social welfare.
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4.1 Restrictive Voting Can Improve Social Welfare
We begin by giving an upper bound on the positive welfare impact factor of
restrictive voting. Then we demonstrate that this upper bound is tight by pro-
viding a lower bound instance showing that restrictive voters can indeed have
that degree of positive welfare impact.
Consider an arbitrary instance I ′ with  restrictive voters. If everyone voted
according to the yes-threshold as ordinary voters, slot a = DDL(I ′, RO) would
be selected. But since the  restrictive voters vote restrictively, slot b is selected.
We assume that slots a and b are not the same, since otherwise there is no change
in welfare, but make no other assumptions about these slots; they are just two
of possibly many. We let s∗(a) indicate the reported score of slot a when all
participants are ordinary voters, that is, vote according to the yes-threshold t.
Let s′(a) indicate the reported score of slot a when the restrictive voters use an
adjusted yes-threshold greater than t.
Fact 1. u(a) ≥ s∗(a)t.
Proof. When everyone votes according to the yes-threshold, then all yes votes
correspond to voters with valuations of at least t.
Fact 2. u(b) < s∗(b) + (n − s∗(b)) · t.
Proof. When everyone votes according to the yes-threshold, yes votes correspond
to valuations of at most 1, and no votes correspond to valuations strictly less
than t.
By Facts 1 and 2, the welfare approximation ratio
u(b)
u(a)
<
s∗(b) + (n − s∗(b))t
s∗(a)t
.
Since slot a is selected when everyone votes according to the yes-threshold,
s∗(a) ≥ s∗(b). Suppose that s∗(a) − s∗(b) = k for some ﬁxed constant k. Then
u(b)
u(a)
<
s∗(a) − k + (n − s∗(a) + k)t
s∗(a)t
=
1
t
+
n − s∗(a)
s∗(a)
− (1 − t)k
s∗(a)t
.
Observe that the second term is largest when s∗(a) is smallest [a perhaps
dissatisfying solution to an initiator]. Since k appears only in the ﬁnal term
(and t ≤ 1), the ratio is largest when k is smallest. If k = 0, the ratio is thus
1
t +
n−s∗(a)
s∗(a) . The above discussion gives the following lemma.
Lemma 3. The positive welfare impact factor of restrictive voters on any
instance I ′ is strictly less than 1t +
n−s∗
s∗ , where s
∗ is the winning slot score
when all voters are ordinary.
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Table 2. Participant types and valuations where restrictive voting improves the social
welfare by a factor of ≈ 1
t
+ (n − )/, 1
t
+ 1, and ≈ 1
t
, respectively, with the last
requiring only a single restrictive voter. See Lemmas 4, 14, and 15 for more details.
Participants 1 2
 restrictive t 1
n −  ordinary 0 t − 
(a)
Participants 1 2
1 restrictive t 1
n/2 − 1 ordinary t 1
n/2 ordinary 0 t − 
(b)
Participants 1 2
1 restrictive 1 t
n − 1 ordinary 1 t
(c)
Note that the case where k = 0 may be dissatisfying because it involves a
tie and tie-breaking procedure. Thus, we also note that when k = 1, the ratio
becomes
1
t
+
n − s∗(a)
s∗(a)
− 1 − t
s∗(a)t
=
1
t
+
n + 1 − s∗(a)
s∗(a)
− 1
s∗(a)t
.
For a matching lower bound, consider the instance illustrated in Table 2a,
with valuations identical to that of Table 1b, but now the ﬁrst group of voters
vote restrictively.
Lemma 4. The positive welfare impact factor of restrictive voting is at least
1
t +
n−
 , suppressing epsilons.
Proof. Consider the instance represented in Table 2a. The utilities of the time
slots are u(a1) = t and u(a2) =  + (n − )(t − ). When all participants
vote according to the yes-threshold t, the reported scores are s∗(a1) =  and
s∗(a2) = , with the tie meaning either slot can be chosen. When the  restrictive
voters vote restrictively, the reported scores are s′(a1) = 0 and s′(a2) = ,
ensuring that slot a2 is chosen. Thus, restrictive voting yields a factor 1t +
n−

improvement of the social welfare, ignoring epsilons.
Taken together, Lemmas 3 and 4 give the following theorem.
Theorem 2. The positive welfare impact factor of restrictive voters is 1t +n−1.
Noting that the example in Table 2a requires the poll initiator to select a slot
with low reported score when there are few restrictive voters (and indeed that
the ratio of 1/t + n − 1 is only achieved when the winning slot has a score
of 1 and most people vote no to both slots), we provide instances in which a
single restrictive voter can still have a positive impact on the social welfare, in
situations that are more satisfying to a poll initiator.
In Table 2b, the structure is similar to Table 2a with  = 1, and gives a 1t +1
improvement of the social welfare but now an additional set of ordinary voters
ensures that reported scores are at least half the number of participants. While
the instance in Table 2b allows a poll initiator to select a time slot for which
half of the participants are available, it suﬀers from the limitation that half of
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Table 3. Participant types and valuations where restrictive voting harms the social
welfare by a factor of ≈ 1
t
, ≈ 1
t
+ t
′
(n−)t , and , respectively. See Lemmas 6 and 7 for
details.
Participants 1 2
1 restrictive 1 −  1
n − 1 ordinary 1 t
(a)
Participants 1 2
 restrictive t < t′ < 1 0
n −  ordinary 1 t
(b)
Participants 1 2 · · · n − 1 n n+ 1

⎧
⎨
⎩
1 restrictive t+  0 · · · 0 0 t
1 restrictive 0 t+  · · · 0 0 t
.
.
. restrictive 0 0
.
.
. 0 0 t
n − 
{
1 ordinary 0 0 . . . t +  0 0
1 ordinary 0 0 . . . 0 t+  0
(c)
the participants vote no on both slots, yet social expectations may make that an
unlikely response for most participants. Thus, we provide a diﬀerent instance in
Table 2c with a single restrictive voter, reported scores indicating all participants
are available, and a 1/t improvement of the social welfare. Full proofs of these
observations are deferred to the Appendix, in Lemmas 14 and 15.
4.2 Restrictive Voting Can Harm Social Welfare
We ﬁrst provide an instance (Table 3a) showing that a single restrictive voter
can harm the welfare by a factor of ≈ 1t . We assume t < 1 − . The utilities of
the time slots are u(a1) = n −  and u(a2) = (n − 1)t+1. When all participants
vote according to the yes-threshold t, the reported scores are s∗(a1) = n and
s∗(a2) = n, with the tie meaning either slot can be chosen. When the one
restrictive voter votes restrictively, the reported scores are s′(a1) = n − 1 and
s′(a2) = n, ensuring that slot a2 is chosen. Thus, restrictive voting decreases the
social welfare from n −  to (n − 1)t + 1, which for n large is ≈ 1/t.
Note that the instance in Table 3a is both plausible from a restrictive voter’s
perspective (choosing to say no to a less preferred slot), and satisfying to a
poll initiator (the reported score indicates availability of all participants). We
now show that with additional restrictive voters, social welfare can be harmed
further, but ﬁrst provide an upper bound on the negative welfare impact factor
of restrictive voting. The proof mirrors that of Lemma3, and is deferred to the
appendix. We then provide a matching lower bound instance in Lemma6, as
portrayed in Table 3b, where s′(a) = n − .
Lemma 5. The negative welfare impact factor of restrictive voters on any
instance I ′ is strictly less than 1t +
n−s′
s′
t′
t , where s
′ is the reported score with
restrictive voters on the slot that wins when all voters are ordinary.
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Lemma 6. The negative welfare impact factor of restrictive voting is at least
1
t +

(n−)
t′
t .
Proof. Consider the instance represented in Table 3b. The utilities of the time
slots are u(a1) = t′ + n −  and u(a2) = (n − )t. When all participants vote
according to the yes-threshold t, the reported scores are s∗(a1) = n and s∗(a2) =
n − , so slot a1 is chosen. When the  restrictive voters vote restrictively, the
reported scores are s′(a1) = (n − ) and s′(a2) = n − , so a2 may be chosen.
Thus, restrictive voting decreases the social welfare from t′ + n −  to (n − )t,
giving the stated ratio.
We now provide an instance of a diﬀerent nature exhibiting a negative welfare
impact factors linear in the number of restrictive voters, and, when all partici-
pants are restrictive voters, that is, n = , the corollary is immediate.
Lemma 7. The negative welfare impact factor of restrictive voting is at least ,
where  is the number of restrictive voters.
Proof. Consider the instance represented in Table 3c. The utilities of the ﬁrst n
time slots are all equal, with u(a1) = · · · = u(an) = t + , while u(an+1) = t.
When all participants vote according to the yes-threshold t, the reported scores
are s∗(a1) = · · · = s∗(an) = 1 and s∗(an+1) = . When the  restrictive voters
vote restrictively, that is, no to slot n+1 (but still yes to the slot with valuation
t + ), the reported scores are s′(a1) = · · · = s′(an) = 1 and s′(an+1) = 0. Thus,
restrictive voting changes the selected time slot from slot n + 1 to any of the
others, decreasing the social welfare by a factor of , suppressing epsilons.
Corollary 1. The negative welfare impact factor of restrictive voting is at
least n.
The example in Table 3c has some nice features, but also some limitations. It
is certainly possible that a restrictive voter who dislikes most of the time slots,
and has similar valuations for two of the slots, may in fact say yes to only one of
those slots. However, many poll initiators, when faced with the reported scores
when all participants vote restrictively (namely that all slots have reported scores
of 0 or 1) are likely to declare none of the options viable rather than selecting
a time to which only one participant voted yes. This concern motivates related
examples whose details are deferred to AppendixA where the reported score is
now a constant fraction of the number of participants (Table 6) and where the
eﬀect of restrictive voting depends on the number of time slots (Table 7).
5 Cooperative Voting
In this section, we make the assumption that some subset of the participants
of size c are cooperative voters, while the rest, n − c, are ordinary voters. Note
that the c must all vote cooperatively, but need not have identical valuations.
We show that cooperative voting can greatly improve the social welfare, but also
can substantially harm it.
Due to space considerations, all proofs in this section are deferred to the
appendix.
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Table 4. Participant types and valuations where cooperative voting improves the social
welfare by a factor of c and 1
t
+ c
n−c , respectively. See the proofs of Lemmas 8 and 9
for details.
Participants 1 2 · · · n − 1 n n+ 1
c
⎧
⎨
⎩
1 cooperative t 0 · · · 0 0 t − 
1 cooperative 0 t · · · 0 0 t − 
.
.
. cooperative 0 0
.
.
. 0 0 t − 
n − c
{
1 ordinary 0 0 . . . t 0 0
1 ordinary 0 0 . . . 0 t 0
(a)
Participants 1 2
c cooperative t −  0
n − c ordinary 1 t
(b)
5.1 Cooperative Voting Can Improve Social Welfare
We present some instances of how cooperative voting can help social welfare,
many of which arise from slightly altering the valuations (and changing the par-
ticipant types) of instances illustrating how restrictive voting can harm social
welfare. More precisely, by switching the restrictive voters from Table 3c to coop-
erative, and decreasing valuations of t+  to t, and those of t to t− , we get the
instance in Table 4a, which gives Lemma 8. In addition, analogously to Corol-
lary 1, when n = c, cooperative voting can help social welfare by a factor of n.
Lemma 8. The positive welfare impact factor of cooperative voting is at least
c, the number of cooperative voters.
We give an instance in Table 4b that exhibits a positive impact factor as
detailed in Lemma9. Notice that when c = n in the instance of Table 4b the
welfare improvement factor becomes unbounded. We then give a matching upper
bound in in Lemma10 on the welfare improvement factor of cooperative voting.
The proof is analogous to the proof of Lemma3.
Lemma 9. The positive welfare impact factor of cooperative voting is at least
1
t +
c
n−c (suppressing epsilon terms).
Lemma 10. The positive welfare impact factor of cooperative voting for any
instance I ′ is strictly less than 1t +
n−s∗
s∗ , where s
∗ = s(DDL(I ′, RO)) is the
score of the winning slot when all voters are ordinary.
Let s∗ denote the winning slot when respondents are ordinary and vote
according to the yes-threshold. Substituting s∗ = n − c in Lemma10 and taking
that together with Lemma9 gives the following theorem.
Theorem 3. The positive welfare impact factor of cooperative voting is 1t +
n−s∗
s∗ .
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5.2 Cooperative Voting Can Harm Social Welfare
Though cooperative voting may be quite beneﬁcial, it can likewise be quite
harmful. As illustrated in the instance in Table 5a, even a single cooperative
voter can harm welfare by a factor of ≈ 1/t. The instance in Table 5b gives
Lemma 11, showing the eﬀects of cooperative voting can be even more harmful
to social welfare.
Lemma 11. The negative welfare impact factor of cooperative voting is at least
1/t′, where t′ < t is the adjusted yes-threshold of the cooperative voters. (This
ratio is unbounded when t′ = .)
The same negative welfare impact factor can also be achieved with n coop-
erative voters, all of whom value slot 1 at 1 and slot 2 at t′ < t. Note that
the situation in Table 5b does not necessarily seem problematic to an initiator
selecting a result. The selected slot has reported score of half of the participants,
which may in fact be appropriate in some settings. If the tie-breaking aspect is
concerning, having one more cooperative participant (with the same valuations)
yields essentially the same results. The default yes-threshold t does not play a
role in this instance. And while the results are most striking when t′ =  is small,
a person who has valuation 0 for one slot and any amount for another slot, no
matter how small, may in fact be inclined (socially) to be a cooperative voter,
thus saying yes to the slot for which they have some marginal value.
Table 5. Participant types and valuations where cooperative voting harms the social
welfare by a factor of ≈ 1/t (with a single cooperative voter), 1/t′, and 1
t′ +
n−c
c
t
t′ ,
respectively. See the proofs of Lemmas 11 and 12 for details.
Participants 1 2
1 cooperative 0 t − 
n − 1 ordinary 1 t
(a)
Participants 1 2
n/2 cooperative 0 t′ < t
n/2 ordinary 1 0
(b)
Participants 1 2
c cooperative t′ < t 1
n − c ordinary 0 t − 
(c)
As alarming as Lemma11 may be, we show in Lemma 12 based on the
instance in Table 5c that cooperative voting can have an even more harmful
impact. The moral here for Doodle poll participants is perhaps as follows: if you
think you are being helpful by voting yes generously in a Doodle poll, don’t be
so sure: you might actually be making things worse overall.
Lemma 12. The negative welfare impact factor of cooperative voting is at least
1
t′ +
n−c
c
t
t′ .
We then upper bound the negative welfare impact factor of cooperative voting
in Lemma13. Observe that the Lemma12 instance precisely matches the upper
bound since s∗ = c.
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Lemma 13. The negative welfare impact factor of cooperative voters on any
instance I ′ is strictly less than 1t′ +
n−s∗
s∗
t
t′ , where s
∗ is the score of the winning
slot when all voters are ordinary, i.e., s∗ = s(DDL(I ′, RO)).
6 Conclusion
People often assume that a Doodle poll is a mechanism for ﬁnding the best time
slot for a meeting, yet we show in this work that the optimal social welfare is
not always achieved. Under ordinary voting, a Doodle-recommended slot may
have social welfare 1/t times worse than the optimal. This means that we might
want voters to (perhaps counter-intuitively) have a higher yes-threshold t. We
also show the Doodle-recommended slot may be as bad as (n − s∗)/s∗ times
worse than the optimal one, where s∗ is the score of the winning slot. So, natu-
rally, a winning slot with a large number of yes votes is preferred. We then show
that cooperative voters may in fact harm the overall social welfare, while restric-
tive voters can improve the overall social welfare. In fact, both cooperative and
restrictive voting are capable of harming or improving the overall social welfare.
We prove worst-case bounds on both the positive and negative welfare impact of
both cooperative and restrictive voting in Doodle polls. We ﬁnd that even with
cooperative and restrictive voting, a lower default yes-threshold, while perhaps
conventionally thought of as desirable so that the response matrix is more easily
ﬁlled with yes votes, can in fact be detrimental to the quality of the winning
slot.
The impacts on social welfare naturally suggest future work in this area,
including the impacts of having both cooperative and restrictive voters in a single
poll. Another direction of investigation would be to use an objective function
that considers not just total utility of the winning slot but also its number
of yes-votes (which presumably predicts the level of attendance at the event).
It would also be interesting to incorporate the social voting hypothesis of [19]
into our model. An analysis that includes Doodle’s “if-need-be” option, though
infrequently used, may demonstrate beneﬁts to poll initiators and participants
alike, as it allows participants to have more power to express their preferences
over the slots, which may result is improved overall social welfare of selected
times. Respondents also then have an added ability to appear more cooperative.
It would also be interesting to investigate alternate mechanisms that may lead
to improved social welfare of the chosen time slot. Additionally, we could ask
what tactics the standard game-theoretic utility-maximizing participant could
employ in the Doodle game model we have proposed here, and perhaps study the
quality of the Nash equilibria outcomes of such a game. Finally, we would like
to acquire and experiment with real Doodle data to see how often these welfare
impact eﬀects play out. Since we would not have users’ private utility values in
this case we would have to simulate the utilities and run what-if scenarios to
determine how likely and how often we see such eﬀects.
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A Appendix
A.1 Restrictive Voting
Lemma 14. Even if the score of the winning slot must be at least n/2 and
there is only one restrictive voter, the positive welfare impact factor of restrictive
voting is still at least 1t + 1 (suppressing epsilons).
Proof. Consider the instance represented in Table 2b. The utilities of the time
slots are u(a1) = nt/2 and u(a2) = n/2+ n(t − )/2. When all participants vote
according to the yes-threshold t, s∗(a1) = n/2 = s∗(a2), with the tie meaning
that slot 1 could be chosen. When the one restrictive voter votes restrictively,
still saying yes to slot 2 but now saying no to slot 1, the reported scores become
s′(a1) = n/2−1 and s′(a2) = n/2, so that slot 2 is now chosen. Thus, suppressing
epsilons, the social welfare improves by a factor of 1/t + 1.
Lemma 15. Even if the score of the winning slot is n and there is only one
restrictive voter, the positive welfare impact factor of restrictive voting is still at
least 1t .
Proof. Consider the instance represented in Table 2c. The utilities of the time
slots are u(a1) = n and u(a2) = nt. When all participants vote according to the
yes-threshold t, s∗(a1) = n = s∗(a2), with the tie meaning that slot a2 could
be chosen. When the one restrictive voter votes restrictively, still saying yes to
slot 1 but now saying no to slot 2, the reported scores become s′(a1) = n and
s′(a2) = n − 1, so that slot 1 is now chosen. Thus, the social welfare improves
by a factor of 1/t.
Proof (of Lemma 5). Mirroring the proof of Lemma3, deﬁne a = DDL(I ′, RO)
to be the slot selected when everyone votes according to the yes-threshold, and
b is the slot selected when the  restrictive voters vote restrictively. Since we are
analyzing the negative welfare impact factor, we must upper bound u(a)/u(b).
Observe that by the deﬁnitions of a and b and that since restrictive voting can
only lower reported scores, we have that s′(a) ≤ s′(b) ≤ s∗(b) ≤ s∗(a). With that
observation, and noting that, similarly to Fact 1, u(b) ≥ s∗(b)t, we then have that
u(b) ≥ s′(a)t. Since t < t′ in restrictive voting, and a restrictive yes vote indicates
a valuation of at most 1, while a restrictive no vote indicates a valuation less
than t′, Fact 2 now becomes u(a) < s′(a)+(n−s′(a))t′. A comparable remaining
argument to that of Lemma3 thus gives the resulting upper bound.
Consider the instance represented in Table 6. Let k > 2 be a ﬁxed constant,
and without loss of generality, assume k | n and 2 | n, for ease of analysis.
The instance has n/2 restrictive voters with valuations as before, but also n/2
ordinary voters, numbered i = 1 to n/2, who all value slot n/2 + 1 at t − , the
slots i to i+n/k−1 (wrapping around for slots exceeding n/2) at t, and the rest
at 0. The utilities of the time slots are u(a1) = . . . = u(an/2) = ((n/k) + 1)t + 
and u(an/2+1) = nt − n/2. When all participants vote according to the yes-
threshold t, the reported scores are s∗(a1) = · · · = s∗(an/2) = n/k + 1 and
A
u
th
o
r 
P
ro
o
f
18 D. Alrawi et al.
Table 6. Participant types and valuations where restrictive voting harms the social
welfare, with a reported score that is a constant fraction k of the participants.
Participants 1 2 3 . . . n/2 + 1
n/2
⎧
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎩
1 restrictive t+  0 0 0 t
1 restrictive 0 t+  0 0 t
.
.
. restrictive 0 0
.
.
. 0 t
1 restrictive 0 0 0 t+  t
n/2 ordinary for ordinary voter i = 1 . . . n/2, t − 
t for slots i to i+ n/k − 1,
wrapping around; 0 otherwise
s∗(an/2+1) = n/2. When the restrictive voters vote restrictively, saying yes to
their one slot with valuation t+ but no to the slot with valuation t, the reported
scores are s′(a1) = · · · = s′(an/2) = n/k + 1 and s∗(an/2+1) = 0. Thus, since
k > 2, restrictive voting changes the selected time slot from slot n/2 + 1 to any
of the other slots, decreasing the social welfare from nt to (n/k+1)t, suppressing
epsilons. Note that while this example does have a more plausible reported score,
it does require the number of time slots to be about half of the number of
participants.
Table 7. Participant types and valuations where restrictive voting harms the social
welfare by a factor of ≈ m.
Participants 1 2 3 · · · m = √n + 1
√n restrictive t +  0 0 0 t
√n restrictive 0 t +  0 0 t
√n restrictive 0 0 t +  0 t
... restrictive 0 0 0
. . . t
Lemma 16. The negative welfare impact factor of restrictive voting is at least
≈ m.
Proof. Consider the instance represented in Table 7. The last slot has utility
u(am) = nt, while the other slots have utilities 
√
n(t + ), except possibly for
slot m − 1 which may have smaller utility, due to the square root and trun-
cation with the ﬂoor operation. When all participants vote according to the
yes-threshold t, most of the slots likewise have reported score √n, again with
slot m − 1 possibly lower, and slot m having s∗(am) = n. When all n restrictive
voters vote restrictively, that is, no to slot m, the reported scores of the ﬁrst
m − 1 slots are unchanged, with most at √n, but slot m now has s′(am) = 0.
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Thus, restrictive voting changes the selected time slot from slot m to one of the
earlier ones (except perhaps for m − 1), decreasing the social welfare from nt to
√n(t + ), giving the desired result.
Similarly, the instance in Table 7 with restrictive voting can be transformed
to an instance showing that cooperative voting can improve social welfare by a
factor of ≈ m by making all voters cooperative, changing valuations of t to t− ,
and valuations of t +  to t.
A.2 Cooperative Voting
We again deﬁne s∗(a) = s(DDL(I ′, RO)) to be the score of the winning slot in an
instance I ′ when all voters are ordinary. We now let s′(a) indicate the reported
score of slot a when the cooperative voters use an adjusted yes-threshold t′ < t.
Proof (of Lemma 8). Consider the instance represented in Table 4a. The utilities
of the time slots are u(a1) = · · · = u(an) = t and u(an+1) = c(t − ). When
all participants vote according to the yes-threshold t, the reported scores are
s∗(a1) = · · · = s∗(an) = 1 and s∗(an+1) = 0. When the c cooperative voters
vote cooperatively, the reported scores become s′(a1) = · · · = s′(an) = 1 and
s′(an+1) = c. Thus, cooperative voting changes the selected time slot from any
of the ﬁrst n to time slot n + 1, increasing the social welfare by a factor of c,
suppressing epsilons.
Proof (of Lemma 9). Consider the instance represented in Table 4b. The utilities
of the time slots are u(a1) = c(t − ) + n − c, and u(a2) = (n − c)t. When all
participants vote according to the yes-threshold t, the ﬁrst group of c participants
report no for both slots, while the second group report yes for both slots. Thus,
s∗(a1) = n − c = s∗(a2), with the tie meaning either slot can be chosen. When
the c cooperative voters vote cooperatively, they vote yes for slot 1 but still no
on slot 2. The ordinary voters are unchanged in their votes. Hence, s′(a1) = n
and s′(a2) = n − c, ensuring that slot a1 is chosen. The improvement in social
welfare when slot a1 is chosen due to cooperative voters rather than when slot
a2 can be chosen when all voters vote ordinarily is thus a factor of 1t +
c
n−c
(suppressing epsilon terms).
Proof (of Lemma 10). The proof is analogous to the proof of Lemma3, except
rather than  restrictive voters, we have c cooperative voters. Note that Facts 1
and 2 which lower bound the utility of slot a, the slot that is chosen when
everyone is an ordinary voter, and upper bound the utility of slot b, the slot
that is chosen when c of the n voters vote cooperatively, still stand as they are
established purely on the reported scores of the two time slots when all voters
are ordinary. We therefore still have the established upper bound on the welfare
approximation ratio of
u(b)
u(a)
<
s∗(b) + (n − s∗(b))t
s∗(a)t
<
1
t
+
n − s∗(a)
s∗(a)
.
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Proof (of Lemma 11). Consider the instance represented in Table 5b. If we set
t′ = , the utilities of the time slots are u(a1) = n/2 and u(a2) = n/2. When
all participants vote according to the yes-threshold t, the reported scores are
s∗(a1) = n/2 and s∗(a2) = 0. When the ﬁrst group (half of the participants)
vote cooperatively, the reported scores are s′(a1) = n/2 and s′(a2) = n/2. Thus,
with cooperative voting, slot a2 may be chosen instead of a1. Hence, the utility
goes from n/2 to n/2.
Proof (of Lemma 12). Consider the instance represented in Table 5c. The utilities
of the slots are u(a1) = ct′ and u(a2) = c+ (n − c)(t − ). When all participants
vote according to the yes-threshold t, the reported scores are s∗(a1) = 0 and
s∗(a2) = c. When the c cooperative voters vote cooperatively, the reported
scores become s′(a1) = c and s′(a2) = c. Thus, with cooperative voting, slot
1 may be chosen instead of slot 2, resulting in the indicated change in social
welfare.
Proof (of Lemma 13). Mirroring the proof of Lemma3, deﬁne a = DDL(I ′, RO)
to be the slot selected when everyone votes according to the yes-threshold, and b
is the slot selected when the c cooperative voters vote cooperatively. Since we are
analyzing the negative welfare impact factor, we must upper bound u(a)/u(b).
Observe that since cooperative voters have a lowered threshold of t′, the claim
paralleling Fact 1 is u(b) ≥ s′(b)t′. We also know that s′(b) ≥ s∗(a) since with
cooperative voting there can only be more yes votes than under ordinary voting,
so the winning score of b must be at least that of a. Taking these two inequalities
together gives us u(b) ≥ s∗(a)t′. Fact 2 now becomes u(a) < s∗(a)+(n−s∗(a))t.
A comparable argument to that in the restrictive voting section thus gives the
resulting upper bound.
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